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This Brief is submitted by the Utah Utility
Shareholder Association of Utah (the •Association•), and Alex
Oblad and Harold Burton, shareholders of Mountain Fuel supply
Company (the •shareholders•), collectively referred to herein
as the "Plaintiffs•, in support of their Petition for Writ of
Certiorari.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case, commonly known as the Wexpro litigation, is
on certiorari appeal herein to this Court from an order of the
Public Service Commission of Utah (the •commission•) for the
second time.

In the first appeal, the Court reversed an

earlier order of the Commission and remanded the case for
further hearing before that agency in January, 1980. 1
After several pre-trial hearings, the matter was set
for further proceedings in August of 1981.

Extensive

negotiations were undertaken during the summer of 1981 between
respective legal counsel and officials of Mountain Fuel Supply
Company ("MFs• or the •company•) and Wexpro Company (•wexpro•),
on the one hand, and the Utah Division of Public Utilities (the
"Division•) and the Utah Committee of Consumer Services (the

1

In Committee of Consumer Services v. Public
Service Comm'n, 595 P.2d 871 (Utah 1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1014 (the •wexpro Decision•), this court reversed and
remanded the Commission's order dated April 11, 1978, in Case
No. 76-057-14.
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"Committee"), on the other hand {collectively referred to as
the "Parties"), in an effort to reach an accommodated
settlement of the complex and manifold case.

Other parties,

including the Utah Coalition of Senior Citizens (the
"Coalition") were invited to attend the negotiating sessions.
on August 31, 1981, the Parties filed a joint motion
before the Commission wherein they requested that the
Commission adopt and approve a Stipulation and Agreement (the
"Agreement")

2

resolving issues on remand from the Wexpro

Decision and certain other issues which were developed and
reserved in Commission orders involving general rate increases
in case Nos. 77-057-03, 79-057-03, 80-057-01, 81-057-01 and
exploration program matters in Case No. 81-057-04.
3
at§ 2.)

(Stip.

2 The staff of the Public Service Commission of
Wyoming is a party to the Agreement. on October 28, 1981, the
Public service Commission of Wyoming, after hearing, entered
an order approving the Agreement as being in the public
interest. No party has appealed that approval.
3 The following abbreviations are used for the
purpose of citation in this Brief:
(1) "Agr." refers to the
Agreement and "Stip." refers to the Stipulation; reference is
made to Sections therein; (2) "Tr." refers to the transcript of
the evidentiary hearings before the Commission commencing
October 14, 1981; (3) "Ord." refers to the Report and Order on
Stipulation and Agreement issued by the Commission on December
31, 1981; (4) "Br." refers to the Brief submitted on November
20, 1981 by the Association to the Commission; (6) "Appl."
refers to the Application for Rehearing submitted by the
Plaintiffs to the Commission on January 18, 1982.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization-2provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The Commission scheduled the motion for hearing in
October of 1981, and took better than eight days of testimony
and argument in connection with the terms and provisions of the
proposed Agreement.

After extensive briefing and further

argument by all parties wishing to appear before the
Commission, an order was entered on December 31, 1981 (the
"Order"), approving the Agreement under proscribed conditions.
Petitions for Rehearing filed by the Association, Coalition,
and a new party, the Utah Department of Administrative
Services, were denied by the Commission on February 9, 1982.
This Petition for Certiorari is taken from the Order.
1.

Background Information Relating to the
Company's Exploration Program

Prior to the Company's formation in 1935, certain of
the Company's predecessor organizations operated unregulated
exploration and development programs under which they acquired
unexplored leasehold acreage, maintained oil and gas
exploration activities and developed significant oil and gas
reserves without participation of any utility company funds.
(Tr. at 1373, 1384.)

After its formation in 1935, the Company

continued the program established by its predecessors.
1372.)

(Tr. at

The method used in accounting for this program on the

company's books, including the classification of assets
developed under it as utility or non-utility properties, was
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based upon the "Uniform System of Accounts" promulgated by the
Federal Power commission and adopted by the commission and was
approved, and to a significant extent mandated, by orders of
the Commission over a period of 40 years.
1384-86.)

(Tr. at 1374-78,

Under the accounting system, unsuccessful

exploration costs, including dry hole costs, were expensed in
the year incurred.

The costs related to successful wells were

capitalized into utility accounts if the well in question were
classified as a gas well and into non-utility accounts if
classified as an oil well.

This method of classification was

specifically approved by orders of the Commission.

Id.

Since 1947, the Commission determined that a part of
the unsuccessful exploration expenses of the program should be
treated as normal utility operating expenses and included some
specified amount of the expenses in its ratemaking equation.
(Tr. at 1377-80.)

The extent to which the specified portion of

exploration expenses was recognized as one of the ordinary
costs of doing business and was recovered through rates has
varied from time to time.

The portion of those business

expenses not included or not recovered in rates has been paid
directly from the non-utility account and, since its
organization in 1976, by Wexpro.

Since 1975, these

unsuccessful exploration expenses have been split on a 50/50
basis between the utility and the non-utility or wexpro.

-4-
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The capital costs or investment in successful wells
were never expensed.

{Tr. at 1378-79.)

Rather, the portion of

capital costs associated with investment of shareholder funds
in unexplored leases and successful gas wells was included,
with other assets, in utility rate base upon which the utility
business of the Company had an opportunity to earn a return.
{Tr. at 1376, 1379, 1381.)

Shareholders of MFS invested their

funds in the Company and based their investment decisions, in
part, in reliance on the accounting practices approved by the
Commission in numerous orders during the 40 year period
relating to the conduct of the exploration program.
The inclusion of unsuccessful drilling costs as an
expense in setting rates and the existence of non-utility oil
properties resulted in contention for many years.
1377.)

(Tr. at

As early as 1953, consumer groups sought to have the

oil properties rolled into utility accounts and to have oil
revenues used to reduce gas rates.

{Tr. at 1378.)

Prior to

1974, the Commission denied this request each time it was made,
and final orders were entered determining that the non-utility
oil properties should not and could not be considered as
utility plant in setting natural gas rates.

(Tr. at 1378-80.)

on January 14, 1974, in case No. 6668, the Commission
entered an order which rolled oil revenues, expenses and
investments into the utility accounts.

News of this order

played havoc with trading of MFS stock and trading of the stock
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was suspended by the New York Stock Exchange.

Before the

Commission issued such order, the Company's stock was trading
at $84 per share.

After the announcement of the January 14,

1974 order, and during the trading suspension, from 300,000 to
500,000 shares were offered for sale with only a single offer
to buy at $35 per share.

(Case No. 6668.)

After rehearing,

the Commission vacated its order on January 21, 1974, and
returned to the long established exploration and development
program that was previously approved with the separation of
utility and non-utility accounts.

Trading in the Company's

common stock resumed when the Commission vacated its January
14, 1974 order, but at a lower price.

Nevertheless, the

pressure from consumer groups to have oil revenues used to
reduce gas rates continued to be a source of friction.

Because

both the regulated utility business and the unregulated oil
business of MFS are capital intensive, requiring large amounts
of investor funds on a regular basis, and because of the bitter
experience suffered as a result of the order of the Commission
and the continuing consumer group pressures, serious concern
about the ability to raise capital at reasonable rates faced
the Company.
MFS recognized many years ago that mixing utility and
non-utility activities in exploration might create problems.
In 1950 it filed petitions with the Utah and Wyoming
commissions to separate the exploration program from the
utility distribution operations.

Wyoming approved the petition
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but Utah did not.

(Tr. at 1376.)

The Utah Commission found

that the problems of a joint program were being appropriately
handled in 1950 and reaffirmed this ruling in 1953, 1957, 1960
(requiring some adjustments), 1968 and 1972 (requiring further
adjustments).
However, the 1974 Commission order created new
concerns for MFS and its shareholders despite the fact that it
was vacated.

In 1976, a group of shareholders sought to take

control of the Company in a "proxy fight" based upon the
potential for problems which existed because MFS had not
completely separated unregulated oil properties and activities
from utility programs.

(Tr. 1388-89.)

In an effort to

safeguard shareholder investments, to attract additional
investment capital, to protect non-utility oil properties from
utility regulation, to allow expanded exploration activities in
an unregulated environment and to enhance system gas supplies,
Wexpro was created as a wholly-owned MFS subsidiary in late
1976.

The oil properties then in the non-utility account were

transferred to Wexpro under the Agreement of Purchase and Sale,
and the Joint Exploration Agreement ("JEA") was established to
govern drilling activities on properties of joint interest
between the utility and Wexpro.
2.

History of the wexpro Litigation

The wexpro case was commenced in December of 1976,
when the Division, and later the Committee, challenged the
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Agreement of Purchase and Sale and the JEA.

The Commission

entered an order on July 20, 1977, holding that it had no
jurisdiction over the transfer.

Thereafter, the Commission

ordered a rehearing to consider certain modifications to the
Agreement of Purchase and Sale and JEA which would allow MFS to
receive all natural gas produced on transferred and joint
interest properties at cost-of-service.
over a period of several weeks.

The rehearing was held

On April 11, 1978, the

Commission entered its Report and order on Rehearing approving
the Agreement of Purchase and sale and JEA if certain
amendments were made.

The amendments were agreed to by MFS and

Wexpro.
The Division and Committee sought review of the order
before the Utah Supreme Court.

On May 10, 1979, the court

rendered the Wexpro Decision reversing the order and remanding
the case to the Commission for further hearings.
During the pendancy of the proceedings, MFS received
rate relief in case Nos. 77-057-03 (Count II), 79-057-03,
80-057-01 and 81-057-01.

The rate relief in each of those

cases was conditional upon further proceedings.

Additionally,

in March of 1980, MFS, Wexpro, Mountain Fuel Resources, Inc.
(Resources) and Celsius Energy Company ("Celsius") filed
applications with the Federal Energy Regulatory commission
("FERC"), Docket Nos. CPB0-274, CPB0-275 and CI80-233, seeking,
inter alia, approval to transfer all unexplored leasehold
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properties used in interstate commerce to Celsius. 4

Celsius

is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Entrada Industries, Inc., which
is in turn, a wholly-owned subsidiary of MFS.
been rendered on these applications to date. 5

No decision has

In December of 1980, MFS and wexpro filed an action
against the Commission, Division and Committee in the United
states District court for the District of Utah, Mountain Fuel
supply co. v. Public service commission of Utah, Civil No.
C80-0710J (D. Utah, July 23, 1981), challenging the application
of the Wexpro Decision on constitutional grounds.

That action

was dismissed without prejudice, the court holding that it was
premature prior to the Commission's hearings in the Wexpro
case.

Finally, Wexpro issues were raised before the Wyoming

Public Service Commission in its Docket No. 9192 Sub 68.
3.

summary of Agreement

In an effort to resolve the difficult issues raised by
the wexpro Decision and related litigation, to prevent loss of
leasehold properties, to restore investor confidence and raise

4 In addition to the regulatory jurisdiction of the
Utah and Wyoming commissions involving retail sales of natural
gas, MFS is also subject to the regulation of FERC, under the
Natural Gas Act, for its gas transmission facilities, sales for
resale in interstate commerce, transportation contracts and
other aspects of its business.
5 These applications were recently amended to
reflect the terms of the Agreement.
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capital for an exploration program to enhance gas resources, to ·
end the lengthy and costly litigation and to establish an
exploration program which could compete under industry
practices with other exploration companies, the Parties
negotiated and entered into the Agreement.

The Agreement

provides for the division of properties, benefits and
obligations, for the establishment and conduct of an
exploration and development program and for the payment of
monies.

A summary of the Agreement is set forth below.
A.

Producing Gas Reservoirs.

The wells, surface

facilities and costs of developing producing gas reservoirs
capitalized in the utility account as of July 31, 1981 will
remain in the utility account.

The gas produced from these

reservoirs will continue to be owned by and delivered to the
utility at cost-of-service.

cost-of-service will be computed

in the manner approved by the Commission in the past.

The gas

liquids and oil from presently producing wells will also belong
to the utility and the revenues from the sale of these
hydrocarbons will be utilized to reduce rates.

wexpro will be

the operator of the properties and will receive reimbursement
for its expenses as its only compensation.
B.

(Agr. at§ III).

Development Drilling of Productive Gas Fields.

The Agreement contemplates that additional gas can be developed
from the presently producing gas reservoirs through development
drilling.

Much of this development drilling will be around the

-10-
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edge of the reservoir.

While it is development drilling of

known producing fields (as contrasted to wildcat drilling),
there is still a substantial risk of dry holes.

wexpro will

provide the capital for such development drilling and will
assume the risks of unsuccessful drilling.

If a development

well is unsuccessful, none of the costs will be borne by the
utility or included in setting rates to the customer.

The

customers will not be called upon to provide any drilling
funds.

If a development well is successful, the costs will be

capitalized in Wexpro, and wexpro will be allowed a 16% base
return (the 16% base rate of return is indexed and will
fluctuate from year to year in accordance with fluctuations in
the rate of return on common equity allowed to twenty selected
utilities and natural gas companies) plus an 8% premium to
compensate for assuming all of the risks and costs of
unsuccessful drilling (Agr. at§§ III-4 and III-5.1).

All gas

produced as a result of future development drilling on
producing gas reservoirs will be owned by the utility.
The Agreement further obligates Wexpro to spend not
less than $40 million in the next five years on development gas
well drilling, only the successful part of which will go into
the rate base.

c.

(Agr. at§ III-8(c).)

Producing Oil Reservoirs.

The wells, surface

facilities and costs of developing producing oil reservoirs are
currently capitalized in wexpro and will remain there.

Gas
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which is produced in association with the oil will be sold to
the utility at cost-of-service computed in the same manner the
commission presently follows. 6

Oil revenues will be utilized

first to pay operating expenses and a 16% base rate of return
(indexed as above) on wexpro's investment in these properties.
After paying the expenses and this agreed rate of return on
investment, oil revenues will be divided 54% to the utility and
46% to wexpro, with the utility's share of the oil revenues
being used to reduce rates. (Agr. at

§

§

I-41, I-44, II.)

In

the event wexpro is required to install secondary recovery
facilities because of regulation, contract or to avoid
financial risks, Wexpro shall provide the necessary capital
investment for such facilities.
D.

(Agr. at§ II-6.)

Development Drilling of Productive Oil Fields.

wexpro will provide all the capital and assume all risks in
connection with the development drilling of presently producing
oil reservoirs.

If the developmental well is unsuccessful, the

costs will be absorbed by wexpro.

If it is successful, it will

be capitalized into wexpro's accounts and Wexpro will earn a
16% base return (indexed as above) plus a 5% premium to
compensate for assuming all risks and costs of unsuccessful

6 currently, less than 1% of the utilities' gas
requirements are supplied by gas produced in association with
oil. Approximately 30% of the requirements come from producing
gas reservoirs and the remainder from purchases from
independent field producers and pipeline companies.

-12-
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drilling.

{Agr. at

§

II-8.}

Gas developed through such

development drilling will be sold to the utility at
cost-of-service; oil profits, after return on investment, will
be divided 54% to the utility and 46% to wexpro.
§

{Agr. at

II-4.)
E.

Exploratory Properties.

Legal title to all oil

and gas leasehold acreage will be transferred to Celsius in
order that it can function as the exploration program entity.
Nearly all of these leaseholds, approximately 1.4 million
acres, are unexplored, wildcat properties.

The utility will

receive a 7% overriding royalty interest on all production
resulting from drilling on the unexplored acreage.

The

transfer will result in removal of approximately $14 million
from the utility rate base accounts and a corresponding
reduction in the utility's revenue requirements.

The cost of

holding these properties (primarily the annual lease payments),
which for the unexplored (Account 105) properties previously
has been divided as a utility expense and a Wexpro
(non-utility) expense, will be paid entirely by Celsius.
Celsius will assume all dry hole and other exploration costs if
exploration is not successful.

Celsius will pay to the

utility, to be used for the reduction of gas rates, an
overriding royalty of 7% of the revenues realized from the sale
of all hydrocarbons produced if the well is successful.

The

utility will also have a first right to purchase all the gas
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produced by Celsius from these properties at market price,
which is the equivalent of third-party field price for the gas
established through arms-length negotiations.
F.

After-Acquired Properties.

(Agr. at§ IV.)

Since it was organized

in late 1976, wexpro has acquired leasehold acreage for its own
account and at its own cost.

Wexpro will pay a 2 1/2%

overriding royalty interest to MFS in connection with such
acreage (about 128,000 acres) acquired between January 1, 1977
and May 10, 1979 (the date of the Wexpro Decision), and on
acreage in the Bug Field in southeastern Utah.

The utility has

a first right to purchase any gas produced from these
properties at third-party market prices.

Properties acquired

by Wexpro totally outside the area where the utility had
previously leased properties and various properties earned by
Wexpro under farmout agreements, even though acquired before
May 10, 1979, have been excluded from the utility's royalty
interest.

Properties acquired after May 10, 1979 (except

certain Bug properties), are also excluded from this royalty.
(Agr. at§ V).
G.

Farmouts.

In the event any of the wildcat acreage

is farmed out, rather than being drilled by Celsius, Celsius
will endeavor to preserve the 7% royalty.

If it is unable to

farm out the properties with the farmee agreeing to pay the 7%
on the interest acquired by it, Celsius will be required to pay

-14-
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a 10% override on its proportionately reduced retained
interest.

(Agr. at§ IV-4(b).
H.

Payments.

In order to settle all claims for

proceeds of oil production for past periods and to resolve the
reserved issues in Case Nos. 77-057-03, 79-057-03, 80-057-01
and 81-057-01, the utility will make a one-time refund by means
of reduced rates, to customers, of $21 million.

In addition,

Wexpro will pay the utility, to be used for reduction of rates
to customers, $250,000 per year for 12 consecutive years.
Commission Proceedings
On August 3, 1981, the Parties presented the
Commission with a summary of the proposed Agreement.

The

Commission set the matter for hearing on October 14, 1981, at
which time the Association and the Coalition entered their
appearances.

The Parties, the Coalition and the Association

presented evidence and argument before the Commission during
the course of hearings held on October 14, 15, 16, 19 and 20,
1981, and November 23, 24 and 25, 1981.

Additionally, a

spokesman for stand United for Rate Fairness, a utility
consumer group, made a statement to the Commission expressing
its reservations about the Agreement.

Notice was published in

a newspaper of statewide distribution for two consecutive days
publicizing the hearings and the opportunity for public
comment.

The news media provided extensive coverage of the
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hearings and gave notice of the opportunity for public
comment.

(Ord. at 4 and 5.)
The commission issued its Report and Order on

stipulation and Agreement on December 31, 1981, adopting and
approving the Agreement.

On January 18, 1982, the Association

and the Shareholders made application for rehearing on the
basis that the Order does not comport with the intent and
purpose that the Agreement be approved with finality, and that
the Commission erred by entering an ambiguous and unlawful
decision which failed to incorporate essential findings and
conclusions concerning its

~inal

and binding effect.

The

Coalition and Utah Department of Administrative Services also
filed applications for rehearing dated January 20, 1982.

All

applications were denied by the Commission in a written order
dated February 9, 1982.

A.

The Agreement was Entered After Vigorous Arm's
Length Negotiations to Resolve the Issues
Presented by the wexpro Decision.

The Agreement was entered into by the Parties in an
effort to resolve numerous conflicts and divisive issues
arising from the Wexpro Decision and expanded litigation.

The

,Agreement was the result of vigorous and difficult arm's length
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negotiations between the Committee and Division on one side and
(Tr. at 1015-1016.) 7

MFS and wexpro on the other.

The purpose and intent of the Agreement is to provide
for the division and allocation of properties for fair market
value and additionally to provide incentives for their
exploration and development in compliance with the wexpro
Decision.

The Agreement itself and the evidence and argument

presented by the Parties reveal that while settlement of issues
presented by the Wexpro Decision seemed almost impossible given
their complexity and the diverse views of the Parties, it was
in the best interest of the customers and shareholders to reach
an accord so as to avoid the expense of time consuming
litigation which would further result in the loss of valuable
property rights.

(Stip. at

§

§

1.19, 1.20, 1.24, 1.25, and 14;

Tr. at 939-944.)
The uncertainties arising from the Wexpro Decision and
related litigation created a cloud over the Company's
exploration and development program.

A primary motivation for

pursuing the difficult task of reaching an accord was to avoid
the loss of many valuable leases which were about to expire and
to prevent the additional loss of experienced and valued
employees in a competitive market where job security and

7 Herman G. Roseman testified for the Division and
stated in response to a question of whether negotiations were
at arm's length: "At arm's, sometimes, arm plus a baseball
bat.n Tr. at 1015.
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certainty are highly sought commodities.
1935-1937.)

(Tr. at 942,

The uncertain future of the Company's exploration

and development program also resulted in the loss of business
opportunities and an inability and unwillingness to finance
major expenditures necessary to continue effective exploration
and development.

B.

(Tr. at 940, 943-945.)

The Primary Purpose of the Agreement is to
Resolve Issues with Finality.

It is apparent from the Agreement that the achievement
of finality is its paramount purpose and a condition to its
vitality.

The Agreement provides that the conveyance terms are

absolute and not subject to rescission.

(Agr. at§ VIII-5.)

It is an express condition to the enforceability of the
Agreement that it be approved by the Commission and any
modification thereto be agreed to by the Parties and approved
by the Commission "with finalityu.
§

3.1.)

(Stip. at§§ 16.1-16.3 and

If the Agreement is not approved by the Commission in

its entirety and the Parties cannot agree to a modification
required by the Commission, the Agreement, by its terms, is
void.

(Stip. at

§

16.3.)

If at any time the Agreement is

found to be voidable or unenforceable by any court or agency,
any remaining terms of the Agreement are likewise void and
unenforceable.

(Agr. at§ VIII-2.)

-18-
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The finality aspects of the Agreement were
specifically addressed by the Parties during the course of the
hearings.

(Tr. at 1611.)

Indeed the Commission revealed that

if it were to approve the Agreement and at a later date
reconsider it, the whole purpose of the Agreement would be
defeated.

(Tr. at 1611.)

C.
The Association Expressed its View to the
Commission that the Agreement is Based on an Erroneous
Interpretation of the Wexpro Decision Which is unfair
to Shareholders, But Supported its Approval if the
Commission would Render a Final and Res Judicata order.
The Association presented to the Commission its view
that the Agreement was entered into in large part on an
erroneous interpretation of the wexpro Decision, i.e., the only
issue before the supreme court was one of jurisdiction and many
statements made by the Court were obiter dicta which this Court
did not and would not consider binding.
1910-1917.)

(Br. at 1-10; Tr. at

The Parties acknowledged specifically that the

utility customers have a tenuous claim, if any at all, to the 2
1/2% royalty on properties independently acquired by wexpro
(nAfter Acquired Properties"), and that inclusion of such
benefit in the Agreement constituted a substantial concession
on the part of wexpro and MFS to settle the matter and resulted
in a valuable benefit to customers.

8

8 Herman G. Roseman testifying for the Division
said with respect to a question concerning the fairness of
royalty payments on the After Acquired Properties: •Those are
-19-
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The Association adduced testimony that the Agreement
does not constitute a fair distribution of assets from the
shareholders' standpoint, but that the Agreement serves a
beneficial purpose to the extent that it is final and
. d'ing. 9
b in

8 (Cont.) properties with respect of which it is my
understanding of the facts that the ratepayers have never borne
any of the costs or risks except possibly indirectly. That is,
those properties were never in the 105 account, they never were
a part of the capital account of the regulated company, the
ratepayers never paid capital carrying charges, delay rentals,
nor would they pay for the cost of the lease were it to be
cancelled. • • • In the interest of getting some sort of a
settlement that was a concession made by the company in an
attempt which I regard as not insubstantial and this was very
beneficial, or potentially beneficial to ratepayers.•
(Emphasis added.) Tr. at 1028 and 1029. MFS's view of the
customers' claim in the After Acquired Properties was stated by
Edward Clyde as follows: "There's a category 6 that by no
stretch of the imagination could the utility claim an interest
in, but the properties that were in contention have all been
put in and then decided [sic] under our formula.• (Emphasis
added.) Tr. at 1932.
9 John F. O'Leary testified for the Association
with respect to his opinion concerning the Agreement. He was
an extremely well-qualified witness as is evidenced by his
employment background indicating he has held, among others, the
following positions: Deputy Assistant Secretary of the
Interior, Chief, Bureau of Natural Gas of the Federal Power
Commission, Director of the U.S. Bureau of Mines, Director of
Licensing, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Director of Energy
Resources Board of New Mexico, Administrator of the Federal
Energy Administration, Deputy Secretary of U.S. Department of
Energy. Additionally Mr. O'Leary has served as a private
consultant and has appeared on numerous occasions as a witness
before congressional committees and before the Public service
Commissions of several states with respect to energy resource
development.
(Tr. at 1215-1217.)
Mr. O'Leary's testimony with respect to the finality
aspects of the Agreement was as follows: •r think from the
standpoint of the stockholders, given the events of the past
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The Association urged the Commission to adopt the
Agreement with the important qualification that the commission
enter an order that is binding and res judicata, i.e., the
order be rendered in a fashion that it cannot be modified or
repealed by the present Commission or future Commissions.
at 1611 and 1612; Br. at 13-20.)

(Tr.

The Association specifically

advised the Commission of those findings and conclusions that
are necessary to the rendering of a res judicata order.

(Tr.

at 1973; Br. at 20-22.)
D.

The Commission's Order Contains Statements
Creating Uncertainty as to its Intended Res
Judicata Effect and Fails to Incorporate
Essential Findings and Conclusions.

In adopting the Agreement the Commission found as a
conclusion of law, that the transfer of the certain properties
and benefits to be received in return, are intended to be
final.

Paragraph 6 of the "Conclusions of Law" so provide:
The Commission's findings and
conclusions with regard to the transfer of
properties and the allocation of benefits
contemplated by the Settlement, including
the findings and conclusions that the

9 (Cont.) 2 1/2 years, there will be a tendency unless some
device can be found to make this final and binding to continue
to look over their shoulder. They found that they were
operating on a premise that turned out to be error at the ~ime
of the supreme court's decision. I think they would not like
to find themselves four or five years from now in a situation
where this agreement could be unravelled to their detriment."
Tr. at 1226 and 1227.
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transfer of properties and the allocation of
benefits are reasonable and for market value
and are in the public interest, are intended
by the Commission to be final and not
subject to future change (except through an
appropriate and timely petition for
rehearing or judicial review). The
Commission so concludes because to ensure
the proper development of said properties,
the parties must be able to rely on the
finality of the findings and conclusions in
regard to the transfer of properties and
apportionment of benefits. The Commission
also is entitled to rely on the finality of
its order. (Ord. at 21.)
However, the Commission made this conclusion illusory
by including other unnecessary and improper extraneous
statements in the Order which create confusion and uncertainty
as to the res judicata effect of the Order and by failing to
include certain other findings and conclusions which are
fundamental and essential to the entry of a final res judicata
decision.
The Commission included numerous statements of
philosophy, findings of fact and conclusions of law which are
inconsistent with res judicata principles (the •rnconsistent
Provisions").

The following Inconsistent Provisions are found

in the Commission's statements of philosophy (the Commission
recognized that such statements are not findings of fact and
conclusions of law):
1.

The Commission believes the utility business
of MFS to be the cornerstone of its
operations and that other activities must
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enhance and not jeopardize that
cornerstone. It is for these reasons that
the Commission is vitally interested in
company restructuring which is in effect
diversification of functional separation
and we believe Utah statutes authorize '
Commission review of such proposals, and the
setting aside or modification of same if,
after a hearing, the scheme itself, or its
logical or intended consequences, are found
to be detrimental to the utility cornerstone
or injurious to the public interest.
(Emphasis added. Ord. at 8.)
2.

Third, the Commission believes the
rule discussed in
the Utah Supreme court's decision and the
potential for conflict of interest or
sweetheart relationship within the structure
of MFS and its subsidiaries require
continued and ongoing scrutiny by the
Commission of MFS and all of its
subsidiaries whether or not they are subject
to a regulated rate of return. The
commission further notes that the supreme
court has appeared to elevate management
responsibility to utility customers to a
form of 'trust' relationship which also
requires such ongoing scrutiny. (Emphasis
added. Ord. at 8.)

3.

Fifth, the Commission believes that
exploration for the development of energy
resources are an appropriate activity for
MFS, both as part of its regulated
activities and those which are not subject
to a regulated rate of return. The
commission recognizes the past success of
MFS' exploration and development program and
believes that MFS should continue in the
future such programs both for the benefit of
its utility operations and those which are
not subject to a regulated rate of return.
The commission notes that while exploration
and development of gas has historically been
a utility activity conducted by MFS pursuant
to commission orders as a joint regulated/
non-regulated venture, the decision by MFS
to abandon exploration as a utility

no-profits-to~affiliates
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undertaking has been implemented
unilaterally without Commission sanction.
The Commission at this time and for the
purpose of this settlement finds it
unnecessary to determine if MFS' utility
activities, which are subject to a regulated
rate of return, should include an
exploration and development program. (Ord.
at 9.)
General provisions, creating unnecessary ambiguity,
which may be claimed as inconsistent, are also found in the
commission's statements outlining •evidence, testimony,
statements and argument of counsel upon which the Findings,
conclusions and Order are made • • • • •,as follows:
4.

Notwithstanding any language which might be
construed to the contrary in either the
agreement or stipulation all parties have
agreed on the record that the acceptance of
the settlement by the Commission in no way
limits or affects the Commission's
jurisdiction or regulatory authority and
further is not to be construed as limiting
the Commission and its future regulation of
MFS. (Emphasis added. Ord. at 11.)
General provisions, creating unnecessary ambiguity,

which may be claimed as inconsistent, found in the •Findings of
Fact•, are as follows:
5.

As will be outlined in the following
findings, the Commission accepts the
Stipulation and Agreement as means of
dealing with the 'Wexpro' case and related
matters. The Commission does not and could
not waive any of its jurisdiction or
regulatory power and authority, in so
accepting. (Emphasis added. Ord. at 18.)

-24-
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6.

As stated in finding (1) above,
Mountain Fuel Supply Company is a regulated
public utility and it cannot escape this by
organizing itself into different corporate
entities, parent and subsidiary in nature.
By approving this Settlement and by past
actions this Commission acknowledges and
supports the proposition that MFS may have
activities which are not limited to a
'regulated' rate of return. we do not,
however, give up our necessary access to
information from the parent or its
subsidiaries, or our lawful regulatory
control over MFS or any of its parties in
accepting this Settlement. (Emphasis
added. Ord. at 18.)

7.

The Commission is not entirely
persuaded that under attractive
circumstances investors will not support a
regulated exploration and development
program, that such a program will cause
problems with partners in the field or with
the ability of MFS to keep employees.
However, the Commission finds that it is
unnecessary to make a final determination on
this matter for the purpose of this
proceeding. (Emphasis added. Ord. at 18.)
Provisions creating unnecessary ambiguity which may be

claimed as inconsistent found in the "Conclusions of Law", are
as follows:
8.

The settlement is an agreement between
the parties and approval thereof by the
Commission does not modify or in any way
limit the jurisdiction of the Commission to
require information from the parties and to
investigate transactions under the
settlement in which the parties are
involved. (Emphasis added. Ord. at 22.)

9.

By adopting and approving the
Stipulation, the Commission does not
relinquish or limit any jurisdiction or
statutory authority it possesses. (Emphasis
added. Ord. at 22.)
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In addition to incorporating confusing Inconsistent
Provisions in the Order, the Commission failed to include in
the Order necessary findings of fact and conclusions of law,
examples of which are set forth in Plaintiffs' application for
rehearing and the Association's brief, i.e., the Commission
acts in its judicial capacity, policy considerations support
res judicata finality, the Order shall not be open to
collateral attack in subsequent proceedings, certain properties
are transferred outside the Commission's regulatory authority
and the Order shall be final and binding on all persons
including this and future Commissions.

(Appl. at 3 and 4; Br.

at 20-22.}
RELIEF SOUGHT
Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Honorable
Court set aside the order and remand the case to the Commission
with directions that it enter a new order which comports with
the purpose and intent of Parties that the Agreement be
approved with res judicata finality.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1.

Whether the Order is sufficiently explicit as to

its intended finality and otherwise comports with res judicata
principles.
2.

Whether the Commission erred in issuing an order

which does not comport with res judicata principles where the
paramount purpose of the Agreement is to obtain a final and
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binding resolution of certain issues and where it is a
condition to the vitality of the Agreement that the Commission
approve it with finality.
3.

Where the Commission approves the transfer of

assets to a non-utility subsidiary of the Company, does the
Commission relinquish jurisdiction over the transferred assets?
4.

Whether the Commission acted arbitrarily and

capriciously, thereby depriving Plaintiffs of property without
due process, by entering an order which does not comport with
principles of res judicata finality.
ARGUMENT
I.

TO BE ACCORDED BINDING AND RES JUDICATA EFFECT,
AN ORDER OF THE COMMISSION MUST BE CLEAR IN ITS
INTENT AND INCORPORATE CERTAIN FINDINGS AND
CONCLUSIONS.

The doctrine of res judicata is a judicial principle
which provides that a final judgment on the merits is an
absolute bar to a subsequent suit between the same parties on
the same cause of action.

The doctrine binds parties and their

privies both as to the issues actually litigated in the first
suit and as to the issues which might have been raised and
decided in that action.
(1981).

5 Mezines, Administrative Law § 40.01

It is a well accepted view that, under appropriate

circumstances, the doctrine of res judicata applies to
administrative agency decisions.

2 Davis, Administrative Law

Treatise§ 18.02 (1970 Supp.).

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-27-

A.

Res Judicata Principles are Properly Accorded to
Administrative Decisions Made in a Judicial
Capacity.

That res judicata principles apply to administrative
decisions was recognized by the United States Supreme Court in
United states v. Utah Construction and Mining Co., 384 U.S.
394, 16 L.Ed.2d 642 (1966).

In that case the Court

acknowledged the hesitation of courts in some instances to
apply res judicata principles to administrative agency
decisions, but made it clear that when an agency acts in a
judicial capacity, its decision should be accorded res judicata
effect.

The Court stated:
Occasionally, courts have used language to
the effect that res judicata principles do
not apply to administrative proceedings, but
such language is certainly too broad. When
an administrative agency is acting in a
judicial capacity and resolves disputed
issues of fact properly before it which the
parties have had an adequate opportunity to
litigate, the courts have not hesitated to
apply res judicata to enforce repose. 384
U.S. at 421-422.
The principles of administrative res judicata have

been recognized by many jurisdictions.

Matos v. secretary of

Health Education and Welfare, 581 F.2d 282 (1st Cir. 1978);
Cooper v. NTSB, 546 F.2d 870 (10th Cir. 1976); Hudson River
Fishermen's Assoc. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 498 F.2d 827 (2nd
Cir. 1974); A. Duda & Sons Coop. Assoc. v. United States, 495
F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1974), aff'd on rehearing, 504 F.2d 970 (5th
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Cir. 1974); Old Dutch Farms, Inc. v. Milk Drivers and Dairy
Employees Local Union No. 584, 281 F. Supp. 971 (E.D.N.Y.
1968); Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Borough of Lansdale, 424 A.2d
514 (Pa. 1981); Campbell v. Superior Court in and for County of
Maricopa, 18 Ariz. App. 287, 501 P.2d 463 (1972).
Several years ago this Court acknowledged that when
the Commission renders a decision in its judicial capacity, res
judicata may properly apply.

The Court in Mulcahy v. Public

Service Commission, 101 Utah 245, 117 P.2d 298 (1941) stated:
'The rule which forbids the reopening of a
matter once judicially determined by
competent authority applies as well to the
judicial and quasi-judicial acts of public,
executive, or administrative officers and
boards acting within their jurisdiction as
to the judgments of courts having general
judicial powers.' (Citations omitted.) 117
P.2d at 302.
The Utah Court attempted the difficult task of
distinguishing the judicial functions of an administrative
agency and in so doing stated:
The judicial function is to define the legal
rights and obligations conferred or imposed
by law upon the community to the individual,
the individual to the community, or one
individual to another individual; and to
apply the remedy and when one such party has
infringed the right of, or failed in his or
its obligation to the other. • • •
The
judicial function is not self-activating.
It comes into operation only on request of
the community or of an individual, when such
party thinks another has interfered with his
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rights, or failed in obligations to him.
The judicial function only plays a role when
there is an apparent controversy over the
extent or infringement of legal rights, and
appeal to the judiciary is made by one party
to define and fix the legal rights of the
parties with respect to the matter in
controversy. (Emphasis added.) Id.
The Order was unquesti~nably rendered within the
"judicial" capacity of the Commission, if such a concept is
deemed necessary to the finality of the Agreement.

The Order

defines the legal rights and obligations of MFS and its
subsidiaries to the community with respect to certain
properties.

The controversy arose upon the appeal of the

Division to the Utah supreme Court from an order of the
Commission holding that it had no jurisdiction over the
transfer of the long established non-utility oil properties
from MFS and wexpro.

The Commission, by adopting the

Agreement, resolved controversies concerning legal rights and
obligations with respect to properties and their exploration
and development, and thereby acted in its judicial capacity.
The premise that the Commission acted in its judicial
capacity in entering an order adopting the Agreement is further
supported by a decision of the United States supreme court
wherein it expressed the view that it is an exercise of
judicial power to render a judgment on consent.
States, 323 U.S. 1, 89 L.Ed. 3 (1944}.

Pope v. United

The court stated:
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It is a judicial function and an
of the judicial power to render
Judgment on consent. A judgment upon
consent is 'a judicial act.'
(Citations
omitted.) It is likewise a judicial act to
give judgment on a legal obligation which
th7 court finds to be established by
stipulated facts • • • . (Emphasis added.
Citations omitted.) 323 u.s. at 12.
~xercise

· 1 ature 10 and this Court 11 have
Wh i·1 e th e Ut a h 1 eg1s
recognized the judicial functions of the Commission, it has
been acknowledged that it is a difficult task to delineate the
judicial from the legislative functions of an administrative
agency.

In his concurring opinion in Mulcahy, supra, Justice

Wolfe stated:
He indeed is to be congratulated who can
pick out the legislative, the executive and
judicial ingredients of many completed
administrative processes. 117 P.2d at 307.

,al
:Ml

10 See Utah Code Ann. § 13-1-1.3 (1953), which
provides in part: "The public service commission shall
exercise all quasi-judicial and rule-making powers in regard to
public utilities as provided in Title 54. The execution of any
rules, regulations or orders of the public service commission
of Utah issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial or rule-making
power shall be made effective and administered under the
executive director of the department of business regulations."
(Emphasis added.)
11 This court expressly recognized the judicial or
quasi-judicial nature of Commission functions in Wycoff Co. v.
Public service Comm'n., 13 Utah 2d 123, 369 P.2d 283 (1962),
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 819, 9 L.Ed.2d 59 (1962); and Common
Cause of Utah v. Public service Comm'n., 598 P.2d 1312 {Utah
1979).
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Plaintiffs submit that all terms of the Agreement
dealing with the conveyance and exploration and development of
the properties, as well as provisions concerning monetary
expenditures must be adopted with finality.

The Commission

failed to make the essential finding that in approving these
aspects of the Agreement it acted in its judicial capacity.
Moreover, a finding that the Commission acted in its judicial
capacity in rendering the Order is just one of several findings
necessary to the rendering of a res judicata decision.
B.

Where Public Policy Considerations Support
Repose, Res Judicata Attaches to an
Administrative Decision.

Commentators have criticized courts for expending
their energies in attempting to classify or define various acts
of administrative agencies for the purpose of determining the
propriety of applying res judicata principles.

Kenneth Culp

Davis in his consummate treatise on administrative law states
that the best approach to finding administrative res judicata
is not to use labels, but rather inquire with respect to the
underlying policy considerations which support finality.
Professor Davis states:
The best approach is to avoid the labels
that have been attached to various functions
for other purposes and to determine what is
judicial or non-judicial for purposes of res
judicata by emphasizing factors which relate
to res judicata • •
The question is not
what is judicial in the abstract or for some
other purpose. The question is whether

-32-
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considerations relating to res judicata
require that the particular action be
regarded as judicial or non-judicial. 2
Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 18.08
(1958).
,
Davis specifically criticizes the Mulcahy decision in
attempting to determine whether or not res judicata should
apply to a Commission order based upon an analysis of judicial
versus non-judicial functions.

Davis states:

The deficiency in this type of analysis is
that it reaches a conclusion as to what is
res judicata without considering the reasons
for permitting or preventing the
relitigation of the same or similar issues.
Whether the issue relates to 'privilege' or
to 'legal right,' a second adjudication of
static facts is undesirable in absence of
some special reason for permitting it. The
court's attention should be focused upon the
reasons for and against a second
adjudication of the same or similar issues,
not upon a futile effort to tag functions as
abstractly judicial or non-judicial. Id.
That policy considerations support the entry of a res
judicata order adopting the Agreement is self-evident.

To

enter a non-final order or an order open to modification is to
destroy the "raison d'etre" of the Agreement.

By its own

terms, finality is a condition to the enforceability of the
Agreement.

The shareholders of MFS and Wexpro have a

substantial investment at stake.

MFS and Wexpro must have the

continued confidence and support of shareholders to maintain
economic viability.

The Agreement must be adopted in a res

judicata fashion so that the shareholders and investors can, at
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last, stop •1ooking over their shoulders• and feel secure that
the Agreement will not be unravelled to their detriment.
Finality is particularly important to shareholders in view of
the history of the Wexpro case where the Commission and
shareholders thought Commission decisions regarding allocation
of properties were final and operated for 40 years in reliance
thereon only to have their investment and operating decisions
overturned by the wexpro Decision.

Shareholders must be secure

that the Order at last achieves a final resolution, as is
required in any adjudication and settlement of property rights
and interests.
The Commission was advised of the importance of
including in its findings a statement that public policy
considerations support res judicata finality of its order.
(Br. at 22.)

such a finding is particularly desirable for the

purpose of avoiding a controversy that could arise in the
future as to whether or not the Order is indeed entered into
pursuant to the judicial function of the Commission, and is
further necessitated because the Order is based on a
stipulation.

C.

An Agency Decision Rendered Pursuant to a
settlement Agreement Must be Clear as to its
Intended Res Judicata Effect.

While it is a well-accepted view that a judgment
entered by consent of the parties may be res judicata to the

-34-
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same extent as if entered after contest, the general rules of
res judicata do not apply indiscriminately to such judgments.
Annot., 345 U.S. 505, 97 L.Ed. 1188 (1953).

Certain

limitations to the general rules have been stated as follows:
The extent to which a judgment or
decree entered by consent is conclusive in a
subsequent action should be governed by the
intention of the parties, as expressed in
the agreement which is the basis of the
Judgment and gathered from all the
circumstances, rather than by a mechanical
application of the general rules governing
the scope of estoppel by judgment. • . . In
particular, it seems that, in the absence of
an unambiguous agreement of the parties to
the contrary, a judgment by consent does not
operate as a collateral estoppel as to
questions of fact or law involved in the
litigation so as to preclude the parties
from litigating the same questions in
another action based upon a cause of action
different from the one upon which the
consent judgment was entered.

* * *

*

From reading the cases on the subject
under annotation it becomes manifest that,
in consenting to a judgment or decree,
ordinarily the parties and their counsel
fail to give adequate attention to the
question whether and to what extent the
judgment is intended to be conclusive in a
subsequent action on the same or another
cause. It is advisable to incorporate in
the JUdgment concise and clear stipulations
on that question. Id. at 119. 345 us at
506. (Emphasis added).
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The difficulty courts have in according a consent
decree the same conclusive effect as a contested decree seems
to be that the consent judgment represents the agreement of the
parties and not necessarily the independent examination of the
subject matter by the tribunal.
In the proceedings below, the Commission closely
scrutinized the Agreement and conducted extensive hearings in
an effort to be assured that the Agreement is lawful and in the
public interest.

The Association apprised the Commission that

in light of the limited application of res judicata to agency
decisions and particularly given the fact that the order
rendered by the Commission would be pursuant to a consent or
settlement, the order rendered must be unambiguous and contain
certain findings and conclusions clarifying the Commission's
intentions with regard to finality.

(Br. at 20.)

The

Commission was urged to avoid the pitfalls inherent in a
judgment based on stipulation by incorporating in its findings
and conclusions statements that its order is final, binding and
not subject to modification or repeal by this Commission or
future Commissions; that the Order shall not be the subject of
collateral attack in subsequent proceedings of any nature; that
the Commission acts in its judicial capacity in rendering the
Order; and that public policy considerations support repose.
(Br. at 13-22.)

The Commission unreasonably and improperly

failed to incorporate such necessary findings and conclusions
in the Order.
-36-
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D.

The Order Is Ambiguous as to Its Intended Res
Judicata Effect.

The extent to which a decision entered pursuant to
stipulation is res judicata is governed by the express
intentions of the parties.
(1953).
finality.

Annot., 345

u.s.

505, 97 L.Ed. 1188

The Agreement is explicit with respect to its intended
However, the Order is replete with extraneous

statements indicating that the Commission reserves continuing
regulatory authority to review, modify or repeal the Agreement.
Certain provisions contained in the Order reveal that
the Commission reserves the right to review, set aside or
modify the functional separation of MFS and its subsidiaries
and maintain ongoing scrutiny of MFS and its subsidiaries.
(Ord. at 8.)

The Commission states that it does not forego any

regulatory power or authority in adopting the Agreement, (Ord.
at 11 and 18), and that it retains lawful regulatory control
over MFS or any of the parties to the Agreement {Ord. at 18.)
The Inconsistent Provisions indicating that the Commission
retains continuing regulatory authority over the subject matter
of the Agreement, create serious questions as to whether the
Commission intends the Order to be final and binding upon this
Commission and future Commissions and thereby preclude the
application of res judicata.
Even assuming, arguendo, that the Inconsistent
Provisions of the Order do not preclude the application of res

-37-
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judicata, the Order is ambiguous with respect to which terms of
the Agreement are approved with res judicata finality.

The

Commission states in its Order that its findings "with regard
to the transfer of properties and allocation of benefits.
are intended to be final.

The Commission leaves open the

question of whether or not the terms of the Agreement providing
for the exploration and development of the certain properties
and monetary expenditures are also intended to be final.
A public utility commission decision will be
interpreted under the same rules by which other writings are
construed.

Creason v. American Bridge, 384 F.2d 475 (10th Cir.

1967); Arizona Corp. Comm'n v. Palm Springs Utility Co., Inc.,
24 Ariz. App. 124, 536 P.2d 245 (1975).

Under the legal maxim,

expressio unius exclusio alterius (mention of one thing in a
writing implies the exclusion of another), the Order must be
construed as not approving exploration and development and
monetary expenditures provisions of the Agreement with finality
inasmuch as such provisions were not referred to in the
orders.

Union Pac. R. co. v. Bean, 167 or. 535, 119 P.2d 575

(1941); State ex rel. Port of Seattle v. Dept. of Public
Service, 1 Wash 2d 102, 95 P.2d 1007 (1939).

It is essential

that res judicata apply to such provisions so that MFS and its
subsidiaries can proceed diligently in reliance thereon.
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II.

CERTAIN FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS ARE CONTRARY TO
THE EVIDENCE AND UNSUPPORTED IN LAW.

Not only do the Inconsistent Provisions improperly
create ambiguity concerning the intended finality of the Order,
certain findings of fact and conclusions of law contained
therein, are wholly

contr~ry

to the evidence and are

unsupported in law.

A.

The Participants to the Proceedings did not Agree
that the Acceptance of the settlement by the
Commission Would not Limit or Affect the
Commission's Jurisdiction or Regulatory Authority.

The Commission states in Provision No. 4:
Notwithstanding any language which might be
construed to the contrary in either the
agreement or stipulation all parties have
agreed on the record that the acceptance of
the settlement by the Commission in no way
limits or affects the Commission's
Jurisdiction or regulatory authority and
further is not to be construed as limiting
the Commission and its future regulation of
MFS.
(Emphasis added. Ord. at 11.)
This statement is an overly broad conclusion upon
which the Commission's findings are made, is not supported by
the evidence and creates uncertainty as to the res judicata
effect of the Order.

The Agreement incorporates the intent of

the Parties that it be final and not subject to modification or
rescission and that if it is not approved with finality it
shall be void.

(Agr. at

§§

VIII-2 and VIII-5; Stip. at SS

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-39-

16.1-16.3, 3.1 and 8.2.)

The finality aspects of the Agreement

were specifically addressed during the course of the
proceedings.

(Tr. at 1611-1612 and 1973.)

The Association

briefed the Commission at length on the importance of rendering
a res judicata decision.

(Tr. at 1919-1921; Br. at 14-22.)

In

order to enter such a decision the Commission necessarily
limits its authority to regulate by amending or repealing its
decision.

In fact, the Association specifically requested the

Commission to incorporate a finding in the Order acknowledging
that in adopting the Agreement the Commission necessarily
transfers certain properties outside of the Commission's
jurisdiction.

(Br. at 21.)

The participants to the proceedings assured the
Commission that if in rendering its order it exceeded its
statutory authority the order would be void.

However, at no

time did the participants agree that the Commission would not
limit its jurisdiction or regulatory authority.

To have done

so would have been to take a position antithetical to the
purpose and intent of the Agreement.

B.

The Commission Can Decide with Finality the
Issues in the Case by Taking Jurisdiction and
Exercising It, and Having Done so, in that sense,
It Has Lost Jurisdiction Over the Property and
Benefits and, in that Sense, It Must Relinquish
its Regulatory Power, in Approving the Agreement.
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The Order contains a finding contrary to the evidence
in Inconsistent Provision No. 5, and an unsupported conclusion
of law in Inconsistent Provision No. 9, which provide:
5.
As will be outlined in the
following findings, the Commission accepts
the Stipulation and Agreement as means of
dealing with the 'Wexpro' case and related
matters. The Commission does not and could
waive any of its jurisdiction or regulatory
power and authority in so accepting.
(Emphasis added. Ord. at 18).
9.
By adopting and approving the
Stipulation, the Commission does not limit
or relinquish any jurisdiction or statutory
authority it possesses. (Emphasis added.
Ord. at 22.)

Contrary the findings and conclusions set forth above,
the Commission by entering a final order, at that point in
time, of necessity must give up its regulatory power or
authority to amend the Order.

It is a condition to the

vitality of the Agreement that its terms be final.

Therefore,

if the Commission does not forego its jurisdiction and
regulatory power to amend the Order, it takes action in direct
opposition to the purpose and intent of the Agreement.
Furthermore, the Commission is able to relinquish its
jurisdiction by rendering a res judicata decision.

Where an

administrative agency renders a decision in its judicial
capacity or where policy considerations support finality, the
decision is res judicata and is therefore binding and not
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subject to modification, i.e., the Commission has no further
regulatory power to modify the decision.

United States v. Utah

Construction Co., 384 U.S. 394, 16 L.Ed.2d 642 (1966); Mulcahy
v. Public Service Comm'n, 101 Utah 245, 117 P.2d 298 (1941); 2
Davis, Administrative Law Treatise,

§

1808 (1958).

on the one

hand, the Commission cannot waive jurisdiction it has to make a
decision, but having exercised its jurisdiction it can and will
in the process, relinquish further powers over the Agreement by
approving it.
The Commission's findings and conclusions set forth
above may be based upon its confusion with the concept that
where the Commission enters an order that incorporates an
erroneous interpretation of law or where the Commission acts in
excess of its authority, its order may be set aside as being
beyond its jurisdiction.

Utah Hotel Co. v. Industrial Comm'n,

107 Utah 24, 151 P.2d 467 (1944).

For example, the Commission

cannot lawfully, under its statutory mandate, order that it no
longer will regulate the operations of a public utility such as
MFS.

The concept is analogous to the legal principle that a

decision of a court tribunal may be vacated for want of subject
matter jurisdiction.

Contrary to the findings and conclusions

in the Order, the Commission can, and in effect does, limit its
further regulatory power to amend or repeal the terms of the
Agreement, if its Order meets the requirements of a res
judicata decision.

-42-
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The Commission's finding of fact contained in
Inconsistent Provision No. 5 that it does not and cannot waive
its regulatory power by adopting the Agreement is wholly
unfounded and contrary to the evidence.

Similarly, the

Commission's conclusion of law found in Inconsistent Provision
No. 9 is an inaccurate statement of law.
This Court has held on numerous occasions that a
decision of the Commission may be set aside where its findings
are not supported by evidence or law.

Union Pac. R. Co. v.

Public Service Comm'n, 102 Utah 465, 132 P.2d 128 {1942):
Bamberger Electric R. Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 59 Utah
357, 204 P. 314 {1922).

Plaintiffs submit that the findings

and conclusions contained in the Order are not so supported and
that the Order must be set aside.
III. THE FAILURE OF THE COMMISSION TO ENTER A RES
JUDICATA ORDER CONSTITUTES AN ARBITRARY ACTION
AND AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAKING OF PROPERTY.
The Association supported the Commission's adoption
and approval of the Agreement based on its understanding that
the Commission intended to enter an order that would be binding
upon this Commission and all future Commissions and not be
subject to collateral attack in subsequent proceedings, i.e.,
the Commission would make a clear and unambiguous Order
containing findings and conclusions which are essential to a
res judicata order.
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The Association expressed its view throughout the
proceedings that the Agreement is based on an unduly broad
interpretation of the wexpro Decision and that provision for
royalty payments on After Acquired Properties is particularly
inappropriate inasmuch as the customers have no justifiable
claim in such properties.

Relying upon its understanding that

the Commission would render a res judicata order, the
Association gave up the opportunity to object to the terms of
the Agreement and assert its views as to what it deemed to be a
valid consideration to be received for the division and
exploration and development of the properties.

Without notice

and contrary to the purpose of the Agreement and the view
expressed by the Commission itself, the Commission entered an
order which is not res judicata. 12

In so doing the

Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously, thereby

12 Commissioner Cameron stated in response to
Edward Clyde's discussion of the finality aspects of the
Agreement: "I don't believe in good faith I could agree to a
stipulation and then a week and a half later notice up a
hearing as to whether or not Celsius and Wexpro were, indeed,
public utilities. It would seem to me we'd be defeating the
entire purpose of the stipulation. Tr. at 1611. Commissioner
Bernard recognized the unfairness resulting from future
regulatory power: "Well, Mr. Holbrook, would part of that
decision be arrived at because of the, call it the
capriciousness or whatever you want to call it, of ordering the
Company to explore for several years and then governmental
agencies stepping in and saying don't do it anymore? It's the
ebb and flow of the people in power of the regulatory process
that causes doubt, isn't it, in the mind of the shareholder?"
Tr. at 1919.

-44-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

depriving Plaintiffs of property without due process of law in
violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the
Constitution of the United States of America and Article I,
Section 7 of the Utah Constitution.

In Washington ex rel.

Oregon R. & N. Co. v. Fairchild, 224 U.S. 510, 56 L.Ed. 863
(1912), the United States Supreme Court stated that a
determination of due process is not based merely upon the fact
that a party is given an opportunity to be heard, but that it
extends to the nature of the order itself.

Concerning the

order at issue, the Court stated:
Its validity could not be sustained merely
because of the fact that the carrier had
been given an opportunity to be heard, but
was to be tested by considering whether, in
view of all of the facts, the taking was
arbitrary and unreasonable or was justified
by the public necessities which the carrier
could lawfully be compelled to meet. For
the guaranty of the Constitution extenas-to
the protection of fundamental rights,--to
the substance of the order as well as to the
notice and hearing which precede it. 'The
mere form of the proceeding instituted
against the owner, even if he be admitted to
defend, cannot convert the process used into
due process of law, if the necessary result
be to deprive him of his property without
compensation.' (Citations omitted.) so
that where the taking is under an
administrative regulation, the defendant
must not be denied the right to show that as
a matter of law the order was so arbitrary,
unjust or unreasonable as to amount to a
deprivation of property in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. (Citations omitted;
Emphasis added.) 244 U.S. at 524.
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In response to a defendant's assertion that a statute
was unconstitutional because it prevented a court from
receiving evidence proving defendant's point, the Supreme Court
stated in Fairchild:
This position would be true if the defendant
had not been put on notice as to what order
was asked for and then given ample
opportunity to show that it would be unjust
or unreasonable to grant it. In this case,
and under the statute, it was given such
notice. The complaint alleged that some of
the towns were important shipping points and
that at all of them there was a public
necessity that the roads be connected. The
defendant denied each of these alleg~tions.
The hearing, both on the law and on the
facts, was necessarily limited to that
issue. There could have been no valid order
which was broader than that claim. Id. at
525-526. (Emphasis added.)
By not being provided notice by the Commission that it
did not intend to enter a res judicata decision and thereby
giving up the right to litigate their view of the proper
consideration to be received for the transfer, and exploration
and development of the properties, particularly royalties on
the After Acquired Properties in which customers have no
justifiable claim, the Plaintiffs have been deprived of
property without due process of law.
Where an order of the Commission is arbitrary and
capricious and invades a person's constitutional rights, this
Court has consistently held that such order should properly be
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set aside.

Barton Truck Line, Inc. v. Public Service Comm'n,

29 Utah 2d 392, 510 P.2d 927 (1973); Salt Lake Transfer co. v.
Public Service Comm'n, 11 Utah 2d 121, 355 P.2d 706 (1960);
Lake Shore Motor Coach Lines, Inc. v. Welling, 9 Utah 2d 114,
339 P.2d 1011 (1959); Union Pacific R. Co. v. Public service
Comm'n, 102 Utah 465, 132 P.2d 128 (1942).

Plaintiffs submit

that the Order is the product of an arbitrary and capricious
action on the part of the Commission resulting in deprivation
of property without due process and that the Order should be
set aside.

CONCLUSION
The Parties entered into the Agreement to resolve
those complex and divisive issues emanating from the Wexpro
Decision rendered over three years ago.

The Agreement is the

product of difficult arm's length negotiations wherein the
Parties agree that MFS and wexpro made substantial concessions
in their views of what would be required had the Wexpro
Decision been fully litigated.

The inclusion in the Agreement

of royalty payments to the utility on After Acquired Properties
was a particularly generous concession on the part of wexpro
inasmuch as the utility has only an extremely questionable
claim, if any, in such properties.

The sole motivation for

entering the difficult and seemingly impossible negotiations
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for a settlement of the issues raised by the Wexpro Decision is
to at last achieve a final disposition of the matter.

A final

and res judicata decision is essential so that the Company will
have the continued support of its shareholders and investors
and so that management may act in reliance thereon.

The

Company and Wexpro may lose substantial property interests and
valued employees if the matter is not finally resolved.

In

such event all parties concerned, including customers, lose
valuable interests.
During the course of the proceedings the Association
voiced its serious reservations concerning the fairness of the
Agreement to shareholders on the basis that the Agreement was
entered into upon an overly broad interpretation of the wexpro
Decision.

However, the Association supported the Commission's

adoption of the Agreement with the important condition that the
Commission order adopting the Agreement be rendered in a form
susceptible to the application of res judicata, i.e., the order
be clear and unambiguous as to its intended finality and
incorporate findings and conclusions which are essential to a
decision entered on the basis of consent.

The Association

briefed the Commission on the requirements of an order based
upon consent and specifically advised the Commission with
respect to those findings and conclusions which are essential
to a res judicata order.
In contravention of the purpose of the Agreement, the
Commission included in the Order extraneous, unnecessary and
-48-
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improper statements creating ambiguity as to its res judicata
effect.

In addition to creating ambiguity, certain findings

and conclusions are wholly unsupported by fact or law.
Furthermore, the Commission refused to incorporate in the Order
those findings and conclusions which are essential to a final
and conclusive decision based upon stipulation.
By entering an order which is not res judicata, the
Commission has left the door ajar for adversaries of MFS or its
subsidiaries to attack the Order or petition in the future for
its amendment or repeal on the basis that the Commission
retains continuing jurisdiction to change the provisions of the
Agreement.

By leaving the door ajar, the Commission undermines

the paramount purpose of the Agreement that it be absolutely
final so that MFS and its subsidiaries may proceed with
business in reliance thereon.

If the order can be modified or

repealed in the future, MFS, its subsidiaries and shareholders
lose a substantial benefit of the bargain represented by the
Agreement and the Plaintiffs assume an unfair and unreasonable
risk.
The Order represents an arbitrary and capricious
action and an unconstitutional taking of property without due
process of law.

Because of its understanding that the

Commission intended to enter an order which would be res
judicata, the Association gave up its right to litigate its
view of a proper distribution of the properties pursuant to the
Wexpro Decision.
-49-
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This Court has recognized that its duties in reviewing
a decision of the Commission are not merely perfunctory, but
that it should provide substantial and meaningful review for
the purpose of giving correction and guidance when the actions
of the Commission are clearly inconsistent with its purpose.
Silver Beehive Telephone Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 30 Utah
2d 44, 512 P.2d 1327 {1973).

For the reasons stated herein,

Plaintiffs respectfully request this Court to set aside the
Order with instructions that the Commission render a new order
consistent with the intent of the Agreement and in a form that
can properly be accorded res judicata finality.

such order

should be particularly explicit with respect to the res
judicata finality of those provisions of the Agreement dealing
with the conveyance and exploration and development of the
properties as well as provisions for monetary expenditures.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

17

,

1982.
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH

~~~~~
E~l~
Attorneys for
Utility Shareholder
Association of Utah,
Alex Oblad and Harold Burton
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day of May, 1982,

the foregoing BRIEF was mailed, postage prepaid, to the
following:
Calvin L. Rampton, Esq.
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough
800 Walker Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Steven H. Anderson, Esq.
Merlin o. Baker, Esq.
A. Robert Thorup, Esq.
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker
79 South Main, suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Thomas A. Quinn, Esq.
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker,
79 South Main, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Edward w. Clyde, Esq.
Clyde, Pratt, Gibbs & Cahoon
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Robert s. Campbell, Esq.
Gregory B. Monson, Esq.
Watkiss & Campbell
310 South Main Street, 12th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Bruce Plenk, Esq.
Ronald E. Nehring, Esq.
Utah Legal Services, Inc.
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Stephen H. Blum, Esq.
Giauque & Williams
500 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Craig Rich, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General
State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Milly o. Bernard, Chairman
Public Service Commission of Utah
State Office Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
David R. Irvine, Commissioner
Public service Commission of Utah
State Off ice Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Brent H. Cameron, Commissioner
Public Service Commission of Utah
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